Flash Trade V2
FLOW SENTINEL MAINNET vault inflow / outflow monitor · ran July–September 2026 · archived record
FLASH6… SOURCE ARCHIVED 6 Oct 2026
ARCHIVED — Flash Trade wound down in September 2026
Flow Sentinel watched every vault of Flash Trade V2 on Solana mainnet in real time from 20 July 2026. Flash Trade announced an orderly wind-down in August 2026; positions were force-closed on 2 September and withdrawals ran on 15 September, and the monitor's live capture ended with the protocol. There is nothing left to guard, so this page keeps the record instead: what the monitor watched, the guard thresholds it was running at the end, and what it caught. Everything here comes from the monitor's own configuration, alert log and commit history. Source is public on GitHub.

What it watched

CAPTURE

Every custody vault of the exchange plus the TradeVault, RebateVault and FAF token vault, and a balance sweep of every token account owned by the program's vault authority, so any account that moved was promoted to full per-transaction tracking automatically. Capture was push-triggered by a WebSocket subscription on each vault with a baseline poll. Each transfer was decoded from the transaction's pre and post token balances to the exact integer and valued in USD at the on-chain oracle mark observed at capture, with Pyth Lazer as an independent price witness and the on-chain census as an independent solvency witness. No external trading API and no synthetic data anywhere.

Final guard thresholds

AS CONFIGURED, 3 AUG 2026
$100,000 / hourglobal outflow cap across all wallets, warning at 70%
$50,000 / hourper-wallet outflow cap
20% / hourvault drawdown limit, net of inflows, with a $5,000 materiality floor so dust vaults cannot false-alarm
1.5%oracle deviation between the exchange's mark and Pyth Lazer, only after the independent feed is confirmed fresh
50× in 24hentitlement guard: a wallet withdrawing more than fifty times what it deposited, above a $10,000 floor, verified against its full on-chain history before any alarm
3-of-7program-upgrade watch: the upgrade authority had to stay unchanged and under the Squads multisig, with authorized upgrades verified automatically

Every detector was labelled either a proof, verified on-chain before it could fire, or a risk limit, a heads-up when a configured threshold was crossed. Only proofs could trigger the automated containment layer; risk limits only ever notified a person.

The record

FROM THE COMMIT HISTORY AND ALERT LOG

How to trust it

VERIFICATION

The dashboard never showed a confident green while blind: if a cycle stalled, the daemon was unreachable or the window was still backfilling it said STALE, ARMING or RECONNECTING. A "drain" alarm needed two independent witnesses to agree. Alarms were proven on-chain before they fired and went to a private channel, so a public page could not be used to manufacture panic. The raw accounting was exact to the integer and every figure traced to a confirmed transaction signature. The code, tests and verification suite are public at github.com/Abdr007/flash-flow-sentinel.